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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No.
8053

EDHAR RONALD PENDERVILLE,

Defendant and Appella;nt. ,

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was arraigned in the District Court
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett on the 6th day of
December, 1952, at which time he entered a plea of not
guilty. The case was set for trial eleven days later,
to-wit, on December 17, 1952, at 10:00 A.M. (R. 7). On
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the 15th day of December, 1952, defendant notified his
attorney, Joseph P. McCarthy, that he did not want him
to proceed with the defense of his case and that he was
discharged from any further legal service in connection
therewith. That the reason for said action was because
defendant was satisfied that said attorney had not properly prepared his defense, notwithstanding he had ample
time to do so and defendant had paid his requested fee
and expenses of $1500.00. Thereupon defendant wrote a
letter to the Honorable A. H. Ellett, judge of the Third
Judicial District Court informing him of his action in
discharging his attorney. Said letter was delivered to
the judge of said court before 10 :00 A.M. on the 16th day
of December, 1952. That a copy of said letter is as
follows: (R. 57-58)
"Honorable A. IL Ellett, Judge
of the Third District Court of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
"Dear Sir:
This morning I considered it necessary to my
welfare to summarily discharge my attorney
Joseph P ..McCarthy together with any assistants
he has seen fit to record as associated with my
case.
In my opinion Mr. McCarthy has been abysmally negligent and derelict in his obligations
relative to my best interests and in the so-called
preparation of my defense. He impresses me at
t~is point as being completely devoid of professwn_al know-how and completely lacking any sense
of h1s deep legal and moral responsibilities. There
are other factors involved, not monetary, which
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have influenced my decision but which I do not
feel free to discuss at this time.
In view of the foregoing I beg indulgence of
the court and request a postponement of my trial
until such time as I am able to engage competent
legal counsel whom I feel will not only represent
me but defend me.
Respectfully yours,

sf E. R. Penderville"
On the 16th day of December, 1952, defendant was
called before the Honorable A. H. Ellett in his chambers
at approximately 9 :50 A.M. and in the presence of
Miriam E. Parker, the reporter of the above entitled
court, he engaged in a conversation with the Honorable
A. H. Ellett, which conversation has been duly reported
in the official transcript of the case from page 242 to 252
inclusive (R. 316-325), as follows:
"THE COURT: Mr. Penderville, I had a letter from you this morning that gave me some little
concern about your attorney. What is it that you
have against him~ I thought he was doing you an
excellent job. I don't know anything about it.
1IR. PENDERVILLE: The whole thing, he's
been giving me a lot of concern for a long time.
Primarily, I wanted this thing to go to trial a
couple or three months ago. I didn't want to wait,
but the situation as it exists now is approximately
this: Mr. McCarthy has had in his hand information for a period of in excess of four months which
he did nothing about. I felt that it was very
definitely in my favor and something that should
be prepared for the trial.
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THE COURT: Are you having reference to
the viewing of a chair inMR. PENDERVILLE: No sir.
THE COURT: He was in yesterday working
on that matter.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. No sir, it
wasn't the chair, although that is one of the math~rs that was brought to Mr. McCarthy's attention
at least two months ago, and apparently he didn't
do anything about it until yesterday.
THE COURT: Well, the thing that irks me
a little bit is I am all set to try this case. I think
there has been a deliberate stall of trying to put
it over, and I wasn't going to be a party to that
and don't propose to be now. I propose to try this
case.
~IR. PENDERVILLE: Well, it is no stall
on my part, Your Honor. As I stated at the beginning, as far as I was concerned, I wanted this
thing over with. I don't enjoy being over in that
county jail one moment. It's an entirely new
experience to me, and as I have already stated, I
don't like any part of it; but one thing and
another, first the preliminary was postponed, and
then this was postponed, and that was postponed,
and :Mr. McCarthy's wife was having a baby.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. McCarthy is ready
to try this tomorrow, I am ready, the district
attorney is ready, and the jurors are ready, and
you come in with this monkey wrench to stop the
machinery of court, and I'm not happy about that.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Your Honor I know
that Mr. ~.cCarthy is not ready to try this case.
In my op1nwn an attorney trying a case particularly a case of this magnitude, should be ~repared
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for any eventuality, and I am thoroughly convinced that Mr. McCarthy is not.
THE COURT: How do you know what he is
going to do, how he is going to direct this trial~
illR. PENDERVILLE: Because we have discussed it together last night.
THE COURT: You are not law trained, are
you'?
:JIR. PENDERVILLE: No sir.
THE COURT: Have you ever had a case in
court, criminal case in court before involving yourself~

:.MR. PENDERVILLE: The only thing that
I have ever been involved in is a military courtmartial.
THE COURT : So you wouldn't be in a very
good position to pass on his qualifications and on
what he's planned for this thing.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, but I know
from certain witnesses that are to be present for
the State that Mr. McCarthy does not have information at his hand. He has also been in a position
to get the necessary information for the past four
months. I have urged him repeatedly to get it.
Some of it he attempted to get a week ago Sunday
by long distance phone calls that he could have
got four months ago for the use of a three-cent
stamp, but he didn't check that until he found he
was going to have to go to trial eleven days after
I entered my first plea.
THE COURT: Of course, you took time
enough entering that plea. You took about three
weeks to do that.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I didn't-that
was his doings. I don't know. Last night I asked

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

him if he had checked three potential witnesses ~or
me here in Salt Lake City. I have been beggin?
him to check these people for months. UP until
last night he hadn't contacted a single one of them,
not a single one.
THE COURT: Well, I am going to try this
case tomorrow. You fired your attorney at a
mighty inopportune time.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I don't know
about that. The only thing I can do is plead not
guilty, and that's that.
THE COURT: Your plea is in. You have a
plea of not guilty, and you have a jury coming in
to ascertain the facts, and you have had plenty of
time to make this decision heretofore.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I have given
Mr. McCarthy this past week to whip this thing
in order, and he has not whipped it in order.
THE COURT: That is your opinion that he
hasn't.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Yes, as I stated in
my letter, that is my opinion.
THE COURT: Of course, you are not in a
very good position it seems to me from your training and experience to know whether he is giving
you a good defense or not. You chose him. He
wasn't appointed by the court for you.
MR. PENDERVILLE: That's right.
THE COURT: He was the attorney you
chose in the beginning.
MR. PENDERVILLE : That's right, I did.
I knew no attorneys. Mr. McCarthy is the first
one that I talked to. I was emotionally upset at
the time, completely distraught. I had had two
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convulsions over in the county jail the day before.
I was desperate enough that I would have hired
anyone, and everybody over in the county jail
knows how I have been trying to get Mr. McCarthy
to do these things.
THE COURT: Have you talked to Mr. McCarthy about this letter~
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. I told him
last night that I was very much afraid that we
had come to the end of the line. He called Doctor
Anderson last night and so stated that he was
afraid that he was through.
THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what I
think about you. I think you are just deliberately
trying to get this case to go over.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, I'm not. I
have done just the opposite. I personally have
been trying to get it tried, but I knew when this
date was set a week ago Saturday that Mr. McCarthy wasn~t by any means prepared.
(Court talked to Mr. McCarthy on the phone).
THE COURT : Well, I don't know. It's just
-you may have a feeling on this thing here, but
Mr. McCarthy tells me that the difficulties that
you may feel that you have with him over the
preparation of this trial involve matters which he
thinks are remote and I am sure from what he
tells me couldn't be brought into evidence, and it
would just be your judgment of what a good trial
would be as against his, and I think that you are
making quite a mistake here.
MR. PENDERVILLE: I'm not the only one
that has this opinion, Your Honor. The opinion is
shared by outstanding professional people in the
city of Salt Lake.
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r.rHE COURT: Whom do you have in mind?
MR. PENDERVILLE: I have in mind for
one Doctor Camilla Anderson.
THE COURT: Well, you had better have
some lawyer that will tell you because these doctors wouldn't know what they could get in evidence. Your background in the past isn't going to
help you. This thing is going to come on what the
facts surrounding this thing were. You could have
been the best Sunday School boy in the world in
the past, and it wouldn't help you.
MR. PENDERVILLE: That I appreciate,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Because you couldn't get it
in. It might help you, but you couldn't get it in.
MR. PENDERVILLE: That I appreciate,
and I am also cognizant of the fact that my life is
at stake in this matter, and I don't believe that
Mr. McCarthy is prepared.
THE COURT: Well, he tells me he is.
l\1R. PENDERVILLE: He did things, Your
Honor, last Sunday by long distance telephone
that he had every opportunity to do over the past
four months. That I have proof of.
THE COURT: Well, I don't knowMR. PENDERVILLE: I have begged him
to do these things.
THE COURT: I don't know how much
money he's had.
MR. PENDERVILLE: He's had over fifteen
hundred dollars from me, every single penny that
I have had coming in every month and as of now
I don't have one red penny with ~hich to employ
another attorney, and I won't have until the first
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of the month. However, I think I can get over that
hurdle.
THE COURT: You are going to be tried
before the first of the month. I am going to try
this case.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Then I will have to
represent myself.
THE COURT: If that is what you want to
do, I am not going to permit that. I am going to
have you an attorney, and I am going to have Joe
McCarthy to represent you because I think he is
prepared on this case. He tells me he is, and there
isn't any reason in the world-I think you are
doing this to stall this case, and I'm not going to
let you do it.
Mr. PENDERVILLE: No, I'm not doing it
to stall anything.
THE COURT : This case is set for tomorrow, and you write me a letter today. You have
had since August 1 to make your mind up on this.
MR. PENDERVILLE: And I have given
Mr. McCarthy all this past week ever since December 6 to do the things that he should have done
three and four months ago. He hasn't even done
those, not up until last night, not even up until
six thirty last night he hadn't done them.
THE COURT: Well, now, what is it you
claim he hasn't done? He tells me he is ready.
MR. PENDERVILLE: He hasn't investigated to meet any possibility that might arise. He
has admitted to me himself that he doesn't know,
that he cannot say positively what will be entered
in evidence and what will not.
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THE COURT: Well, I suppose. he .wouldn't
know that. He can't know what the d1stnct attorney is going to do.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, but he is not
prepared because he hasn't investigated angles of
this case that even came out at the preliminary.
THE COURT: Well, you had better stay
with your attorney that is prepared for you instead of trying to get one that the court would
appoint for you because I am going to try this
case tomorrow.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I shallTHE COURT: And if your evidence is not
presented there and if you are found guilty, then,
of course, you could file some affidavits for newly
discovered evidence. I don't believe that Mr. McCarthy has sold you down the river. I think Mr.
McCarthy has done you a good job in making this
preparation.
MR. PENDERVILLE: I can't help but believe at this time Mr. McCarthy has done anything
but speak to me of appeal. He is not going to
come in here and tell the court the things about
which he spoke to me. He's done nothing but
speak of appeal since he first introduced himself
into the case. At this point, he's been talking
about appeal for the last week or ten days. I have
informed him that I am not interested in appeal,
that appeal is not the matter at this time. The
trial is the matter.
(District Attorney Roberts comes into the
Court's chambers)~
THE COURT: M-r. Roberts this gentleman
feels that because Mr. McCarthy ~an't foresee all
the evidence that is going to be presented here
that he's let him down. I can't help but feel this
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is a stall to keep from trying this case tomorrow.
:l\Ir. l\leCarthy tells me he is ready, that he's
worked on the case, that he thinks he is in position
to present it, that he is willing to represent the
gentleman. He doesn't desire to represent a man
who doesn't want him to work for him. Do you
have any ideas or suggestions here?
l\IR. ROBERTS: Well, has Mr. Penderville
in fact fired, discharged Mr. McCarthy?
THE COURT: Mr. McCarthy didn't know
anything about it. He's written me a letter in
which he says he has.
MR. PENDERVILLE: I told Mr. McCarthy
last night that it was very probable that I would,
and he called Doetor Anderson last night and conveyed that information to Doctor Anderson last
night. It is particularly evident to support my
statement that he has had notice that it probably
was coming. I have been attempting to explain
my position to Judge Ellett. In my opinion, Mr.
McCarthy has had four months. I wanted to go
to trial on this thing myself a couple of months
ago and get it over with. Mr. McCarthy in the
period of the last eight days did attempt by long
distance phone calls what he could have done with
a three-cent stamp three or four months ago.
THE COURT: Of course, I don't know that
that matters to youMR. PENDERVILLE: He still doesn't have
it.
THE COURT: -how he gets his preparation or whether he determines that a phone call
might be better than a stamp. I don't see how that
gives you any occasion for alarm.
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MR. PENDERVILLE: My point, Your
Honor is that he was informed of these contingencies' four months ago.
THE COURT : Informed nothing. He and
you were the ones that have been asking for this'
thing. You stood up in open court and asked me
each time that this thing go over. I have been trying to get this to trial for over a month.
MR. PENDERVILLE : I asked that at the
behest of my attorney. I didn't know what his
plans were, what he was attempting to do. I believe Mr. Roberts is aware of certain developments that came by long distance phone and which
I believe the necessary papers have been sent for
a deposition. That was information that Mr.
McCarthy had four months ago.
THE COURT: The State can't use a deposition on you.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. I am merely
stating that I believe Mr. Roberts is aware of that.
MR. ROBERTS: Joe asked me the other day
if I would agree to having some interrogatories
sent down to a doctor in San Francisco, and I
agreed that I would have no objection and that he.
could go ahead and do it, and I would not raise
any question about it at the trial, and so those
were sent down. That is the last I heard of them,
and that has been about a week ago.
MR. PENDERVILLE: And he hasn't received them up until last night, but that is one of
my points. He was in possession of that information four months ago. I have begged and implored
him, cajoled him, everything to try to get this
information.
THE COURT: You don't know whether he
has those answers or not.
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~lR. PENDERVILLE: I know he sent them.
At least he told me he sent them.
THE COURT: But you don't know whether
he has them back or not. He says he is ready.
l\IR. PENDERVILLE: He told me last night
he hadn't received them yet.
THE COURT: Well, do you want me to
appoint a lawyer for you~
l\IR. PENDERVILLE: I think that I can
make arrangements, or I should like after this
incident-! should certainly like to see three or
four attorneys.
THE COURT: I'm not going to do that. I
will tell you, because I think you are stalling on
me, I will appoint a lawyer if you want to, or you
can go ahead with Mr. McCarthy, and it is immaterial to me which you do.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, I shan't go
ahead with Mr. McCarthy because I know definitely he is not prepared.
THE COURT: Well, I am going to appoint
him for you anyway, and this case is going to trial
tomorrow. You will be prepared for it.

MR. PENDERVILLE: Yes sir."
That on the morning of the 17th of December, 1952,
Joseph P. McCarthy contacted defendant in the courtroom before court convened and told him that Judge
Ellett had appointed him to conduct the defense at the
trial of said case, and that if defendant had any objections to proceeding with the trial with Joseph P. McCarthy as affiant's attorney, to make the objections to
Judge Ellett in his chambers and not in open court before
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the jury panel as the judge did not want the jury
prejudiced by any statements made by any of the parties.
Thereupon defendant told said attorney that he had made
strenuous objections the day before to Judge Ellett
against the appointing of said attorney to represent him;
that he would prefer to try his own case if he would not
let him employ other counsel, and the judge positively
refused to let him do so, stating that he was going to
appoint said Joseph P. McCarthy notwithstanding that
defendant told the court that he would not go ahead with
Mr. McCarthy because defendant definitely knew that
said attorney was not prepared; that the court thereupon
told defendant that he was going to appoint him anyway
to defend him and that the case was going to trial the
next morning; that said attorney thereupon told him that
he could not do anything about it as the court had
appointed him to represent him; defendant thereupon
asked said attorney what he should do and said attorney
told him he had done everything he could do in view of
the judge's ruling that the case was going to be tried
and that said attorney would have to represent him. That
later in the morning and before the court convened,
defendant was called into the chambers of Judge Ellett
and, in the presence of Mr. Brigham E. Roberts, counsel
for the State, Miriam E. Parker, reporter of the court,
and the defendant, Edgar Ronald Penderville, and out of
the presence of the jury, the following conversation took
place:
.
".THE COURT : Let me ask you gentlemen
In this case that is on trial, the State vs. Edgar
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Ronald Penderville, is the State ready in that
case, :Mr. Roberts?
.MR. ROBERTS: The State is ready.
THE COURT: And is the defendant ready,
Mr. :McCarthy~
~IR. ~IcCarthy: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Very well. I have your requested questions to be asked on voir dire, and I
suppose there are no other preliminary matters
here~

MR. McCARTHY:
(R. 64)

None that I know of."

A careful .analysis of the evidence in this case is
necessary to give to the court the basis of many of the
assignments of error stated in this brief. Defendant was
charged by the information with the crime of murder in
the first degree for killing his wife, June Weiler Penderville, on or about July 30, 1952. In the presentation of
the facts, we will segregate the direct evidence surrounding the homicide from the maze of medical testimony
introduced in the case.
At 5:15 P.M. on the 30th day of July, 1952, Dr.
Lyman Condie came to defendant's apartment, No. 2 at
1012 Barbara Place, in answer to defendant's request
that he see his wife, June Weiler Penderville, who was
suffering from an alcoholic and barbiturate addiction (R.
118). Dr. Condie had previously been treating Mrs.
Penderville for chronic alcoholism. He had indicated
that Mrs. Penderville would have to be sent to the Salt
Lake County Hospital for treatment, and if necessary,
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committed to a mental institution (R. 119). The doctor
advised Mr. Penderville that if he did not comply with
his request, he did not wish to have anything more to do
with the case. Mr. and Mrs. Penderville said they would
let him know the following morning. Mrs. Penderville
at that time was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
and pleaded for something to help her sleep. The doctor
gave her three one-and-a-half-grain seconal capsules and
left one grain-and-a-half seconal capsule with Mr. Penderville to give his wife if further sedation was necessary (R. 119). The doctor explained that he gave this
heavy dose of barbiturates for the reason that the excessive use of alcohol creates a high tolerance to barbiturates. At that time Dr. Condie observed that Mrs.
Penderville had some old contusions about the eyes,
which he called black eyes. They were of old origin. She
had a few old contusions about the face, particularly on
the cheeks and jaw. They were light purple to yellowish
contusions. She was not bleeding from the nose or mouth.
There were no marks on her neck that were visible. He
left at 6:00 o'clock P.M. (R. 120). Later that evening
at approximately 9:45 Dr. Condie received a call from
William Christensen, an attorney, to come to the Penderville apartment. He arrived there at approximately 9:55
P.M. He was met at the door by Mr. Penderville who
said, "Hurry, I think she has a pulse." Immediately he
went to Mrs. Penderville and could obtain no pulse. He
listened to her heart and could hear no heart beat and
observed no effort at respiration. He thought she was
dead at that time (R. 121). He made an examination of
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her body and there was a difference 1n the condition
which he found at that time compared with his observations earlier that sa1ne evening. She had some large contusions or black eyes about the orbit of the head. They
were considerably larger than what he had observed in
his first examination and the blood or skin in that area
was dark purple. She also had contusions and abrasions
about the face, neck and the chest. He had not observed
these contusions in his earlier examination because she
was fully clothed. The contusions about the neck and face
were of recent origin. He stated that Exhibits B and C
were a true and correct representation of the upper area
of her body, neck and head as he observed it when he
arrived at 9 :55 P.M. ( R. 122). He further stated there
was blood in her nostrils and mouth and that when he
examined her ears with an otoscope, he observed a very
small punctate hermorrhage in both tympanic membranes
or eardrums. The only people present at the time he
returned were 1\fr. Penderville and Mr. Christensen.
On cross-examination by defendant's lawyer, Mr.
Joseph P. :McCarthy, Dr. Condie testified that he had
examined Mrs. Penderville previously on July 27th, and
on redirect examination by Mr. Roberts, after having
been given leave to ask some questions on direct examination, the following testimony was given by Dr. Condie:
(R. 130)
"THE COURT: Yes, you may reopen your
direct.
Q. Was there any further conversation at
your meeting on the 27th with them concerning
her physical condition~
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A. I was conversing with Mr. Pen~erville,
and he was discussing the various col!tus1o~s she
had and she said 'He hit me ' and he 1mmed1ately
'
that. He ' said, 'Oh, 'you were drunk and
denied
were stumbling around the room.'"
The doctor testified that he did not detect the odor
of alcohol or paraldehyde on the breath of Mr. Penderville at his first visit on July 30th between 5:15 to 6:00
P.M.; that he paid no attention to Mr. Penderville on his
second visit to the apartment at 9:55 as he was too busy
with 1\Irs. Penderville (R. 138). He stated that when he
arrived at the apartment on the 30th he detected paraldehyde on the breath of the deceased Mrs. Penderville. He
further stated that paraldehyde is related to alcohol in
its chemical structure and is a sedative and hypnotic and
is characterized as a central nervous system depressant.
He further stated that he had prescribed paraldehyde
for the deceased Mrs. Penderville (R. 126).
SUSAN ELIASON- Witness- (R. 138)
Susan Eliason resides at 1012 Barbara Place, in
apartment No. 3 right over apartment No.2 occupied by
Mr. and Mrs. Penderville. She was then 14 years of age
and in the ninth grade in school. The bedroom and bathroom of the Eliason apartment are directly over the bedroom and bathroom of the Penderville apartment (R.
139). Miss Eliason testified that she was getting dressed
at about the hour of 7:00 on July 30th. She was in the
bedroom and bathroom directly over the corresponding
rooms of the Penderville apartment. She heard a noise
coming from below. She testified :
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"I wasn't sure what it was. It sounded like it
was strunping and a lot of racket and beating on
the wall and things like that. * * * It sounded like
something was thumping on the floor and against
the wall. * * * It lasted until about seven twentyfive, around that time. * * * I didn't know what
it was. I thought they were making a lot of noise,
and it made me mad, so I stamped my foot on the
floor to quiet it. * * * It kept going on." (R. 140)
She left the apartment about 7:25 and the noise was
still continuing when she left. She did not hear any cries,
or outcries, or screams of any kind, or persons voices at
all. The only thing she heard was the sound which she
described as above. She said she was going out on a
date and she started to get ready a little before 7:00 and
she was running the bath water and she could still hear
the sound below. She couldn't tell exactly where it was.
She said, "I know it was in the vicinity of the Penderville
apartment." When she returned later that evening she
learned of the death of Mrs. Penderville at the Penderville apartment (R. 141).
On cross-examination Miss Eliason stated that the
noise she heard "sounded like someone was stamping
their feet or something hard on the floor, just pounding."
She further stated she heard no voices, no outcry, no
yells or screams of any kind; that she passed by the door
of the Penderville apartment on her way out and, in
answer to the question if she heard the noise as she went
by, stated, "I wasn't exactly listening. I was kind of in
a hurry and ran down the stairs and hurried out." She
further stated in coming down she did not hear any out-
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cry at all (R. 144). She stated that she did not make any
comment at anytime between 7:00 and 7:25 to her mother
or anyone else who may have been home. She said her
mother did not hear it and proffered the explanation
that her mother was on the other side of the house watching television ( R. 145). She knew the Pendervilles had
a 1947 Cadillac but she did not remember seeing it outside when she left.
WILLIA~1:

J. CHRISTENSEN (R. 148)

William J. Christensen, a lawyer, was called by the
State and testified as follows: That on the 30th of July
he received a telephone call from the defendant at about
fifteen minutes before 9 :00 in the evening. That pursuant to this call he went down to the Penderville apartment at 1012 Barbara Place and he arrived there around
9 :00 o'clock or maybe a few minutes before. }.fr. Penderville was there and his wife, ~Irs. June Penderville, was
lying on the living room floor. A chenille bedspread was
over her body. He could see the straps on a slip and there
was an ice pack on her eye and head. He states Exhibit
D does not show the approximate position she was in
when he arrived. There was no pillow under her head
and her neck was not stretched back as shown in the
exhibit. She was lying on the floor and her head was a
little to one side, with an ice pack covering most of her
head. She was moved to the position shown in Exhibit
D after the photographers and detectives arrived there.
He left the apartment about 2 :00 A.M. on the morning
of July 31st (R. 149).
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On cross-exa1nination ~[r. Christensen stated that
he rang the door bell and the defendant appeared and
when the witness started to tell the conversation, the
State objected on the grounds it was hearsay. Defendant's attorney, ~lr. McCarthy contended it was part of
the res gestae and the court sustained the objection (R.
151). ~lr. Christensen testified that his curiosity was
naturally aroused when he observed Mrs. Penderville on
the floor and in answer to the question, "Did you ask
any question, what happened or something to that effect,"
the State objected to the conversation on the ground of
hearsay and the court sustained the objection. Defendant's attorney contended that the conversation was part
of the res gestae. The court then asked the question,
"How long was it after you were called before you
arrived~" Mr. Christensen answered, "Ten or fifteen
minutes after I was called." The court again sustained
the objection. The witness testified that the defendant
did not appear to be upset; that he was perfectly
rational; that he did not seem to be alarmed or fearful;
that he appeared to be about normal as he had observed
him on other occasions. The witness testified that Mrs.
Penderville was alive and breathing rather heavily when
he arrived. That about forty-five minutes later she discontinued breathing. Mr. Penderville first noted the
change in his wife's condition and he said, "She's quit
breathing," and the witness said, "Well, you had better
get a doctor right away." Mr. Penderville requested him
to call Dr. Condie and that he would have to use the
office phone as the phone in the apartment was not
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connected. He called Dr. Condie and the doctor told him
he had an emergency call and did not know whether he
could come or not. He told Mr. Penderville of the conversation with Dr. Condie and the defendant said, "My
gosh, we have got to have somebody. We have got to
get him or someone else." ( R. 155). Mr. Penderville then
went down to call a doctor. He was gone about five or
six minutes. In about ten or fifteen minutes Dr. Condie
arrived (R. 156). The witness was asked hy the defendant's counsel if he noticed the conduct of the defendant
at the time the doctor first arrived and his answer was,
"Yes, sir." When he was asked what he observed the
court sustained an objection on the ground it was not
proper cross-examination. Mr. Penderville called the
police and the resuscitator squad arrived about 10 :00
o'clock P.l\I. Detectives Frank Gilbert and Del Duncombe
arrived. The witness was not permitted to testify as
to what he heard of the questioning of Mr. Penderville
by these detectives as the court sustained the State's
objection that it was immaterial, irrelevant and not
proper cross-examination. After the detectives arrived
there was a virtual parade of photographers and other
persons that came to the apartment. The arrangement of
the body was altered from time to time while he was
there. It was altered in the preparation by the photographers by putting the pillow up under her shoulder and
stretching her head back so her neck was exposed (R.
161). The following testimony and rulings of the court
are pertinent:
"Q. Then I believe you testified that he did
replace the ice pack~
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A. That is correct. He went into the kitchen
and then came backMR. ROBERTS: NowTHE COURT: Don't give us-let's get this
thing over and get out of the treadmill. Just
answer the question without a dissertation. Go
ahead ilir. McCarthy.
Q.

What did the defendant do after

that~

A. I believe it was shortly after that that
the doorbell rang. Well, he continued his conversation with me right after that.
MR. McCARTHY: Your Honor, I know you
have ruled that we can't repeat the subject matter
of the conversation.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. McCARTHY: Is it a proper question
to ask what the conversation concerned without
an attempt to repeat any of the language~
THE COURT: Well, you go ahead and ask
the questions you want to. I will rule on the
objections if they are made. I suppose counselQ.

What was the subject of the conversa-

tion~

MR. ROBERTS: We object to it as immaterial and irrelevant and hearsay.
THE COURT: That objection will be overruled.
MR. ROBERTS: And calling for a conclusiOn.
THE COURT: That objection is overruled.
Q.

Would you

answer~
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MR. ROBERTS: Of course, we object to it
also Your Honor on the ground it is not proper
cross' examination.'
THE COURT: That objection will be sustained.
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. McCARTHY: Apparently we are going to have to recall you as our own witness. I
believe that will be all for now then." (R. 163-164)
<L J. MURPHY- (R. 166)
Mr. G. J. :l\Iurphy testified that he lived at 1012
Barbara Place and he was the caretaker of all of th~
thirty-nine apartments including the motel rooms. That
he was acquainted with the defendant and his wife, June
Weiler Penderville, having met them about the 1st of
July, 1952, when they rented apartment No. 2 at 1012
Barbara Place. That during the month of July he heard
the defendant arguing with his wife in the bedroom.
Defendant said, "Get up, get up, get up off your dead
ass and get me something to eat. You haven't cooked me
ten meals in the last six months." (R. 169). He heard
other conversations but could not recognize the words,
except he heard the defendant say, "You know where it
is, you get it." He never heard Mrs. Penderville say anything back to these statements. He said he was in and
about and around the apartment throughout the 30th day
of July. He knew the Pendervilles had a 1947 Cadillac;
that it was constantly there, and on the 30th day of July
he saw it there all day (R. 170). He first testified that
he did not see the defendant at anytime during the day
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of the 30th of July (R. 171). Later in answer to the
question, .. How n1any times did you see the defendant,
the witness stated:
·· ~\. Well, I saw him the first time about five
o'clock when I came in. That's generally when I
get through. Sometimes I have to go out after
dinner and pick up my hose or something, but at
five o'clock he was at the phone when I went
through the office to go to our apartment; and
then, of course, naturally when we hear somebody
come in the door, we always go see who it is, see
if somebody wants something, and at five thirty
again he was in there again, and so on up to about
six thirty he was in and out using the phone. Of
course, we don't know who he is talking to. We
don't want to know. It isn't our business.

Q. That's all right. Did you see him again
after six thirty~
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. What time was the next time you saw
him~

A.

It was, oh, perhaps seven thirty.

Q. And where was he at that
did you see him at that time.
A.

time~

Where

He came down to use the phone again.

Q. And when did you next see him~
A. I don't think I saw him after that until
the officers took him out.

Q. And that was the last time that you saw
him then before the officersA.

Yes." (R. 172).
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On cross-examination his attention was called to his
testimony at the preliminary hearing in the transcript of
that hearing on page 93, as follows:
"Q. Question, "Now, calling your attention
to July 30, did he have occasion to use your phone
numerous times that evening1" Answer, "Yes."
Question, "Will you relate to the best of
your recollection as to how many times and when
he used your phone 1" Answer, "Well, he used it
about five o'clock, five thirty, five forty-five, and
six thirty, and then again about nine thirty, nine
or nine thirty."
A. Yes, he did.
Q. There is no mention of the time there of
seven thirty, at all?
A. Well, it was possible I didn't think of it
at the time." (R. 174).
The witness further testified that he did not see where
Mr. Penderville came from when he made the telephone
call at 7:30. When the witness came in the office door,
Mr. Penderville was inside using the phone (R. 175).
DELBERT F. DUNCOMBE- (R. 177)
Mr. Duncombe stated he was a police officer for Salt
Lake City for some twenty-three years. That he received
a call about 10 :09 on the night of July 30th to go to the
defendant's apartment. He arrived there four or five
minutes later. Two other police officers Dr. Condie Mr.
Christensen and defendant were in the' apartment.' He
made certain investigations for blood spots or marks.
Those that he found in and around the place he directed
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pictures to be taken of. He identified State's Exhibit J
as a true and correct representation of the north part
of the living rooin and the upper portion of the chair
which is along the east wall. He discovered blood there
on the chair and on the wall as shown in said exhibit.
He indicated to the jury that the black marks or spots in
the background on Exhibit J were the spots he had
reference to. On the back of the chair were blood spots
or smears. He identified Exhibit K as a true and ~orrect
representation of the box marked "books." The picture
was taken from the north toward the south. The witness
testified he had no experience in chemical analysis, but
the spots appeared to be blood to him. He testified the
spots on the box appeared to be very fresh. No tests or
typing were made of the alleged blood spots to determine
whether the blood came from the deceased or someone
else. No laboratory tests were made. The witness pointed
out on Exhibit K to the jury the spots in question. He
testified as follows:
"A. This is a box that contained books. This is
where the head of the body was lying, and the
black spot was here on the bottom of the box,
what appeared to be blood to me, also this little
black spot here right on the edge of the carpet and
the box, right here on the carpet was headed so
in the picture the blood-what appeared to be
blood had come back into the carpet, which doesn't
show on the picture here." (R. 183).
He identified State's Exhibit Las a true and correct
representation of one of the places where alleged blood
spots appeared. He identified Exhibit M as another
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place where there appeared to be blood spots. The picture shows a portion of the living room with two spots
on the wall and the third spot on the door casing. The
witness pointed out on Exhibits L and M the location of
the~e alleged blood spots. He testified as follows:
"A. These spots there on what we call a
door jamb, that would be the part where the door
goes in this way. This is the corner part of the
davenette which sits in the living room. This is
an entrance which leads into a hall here, the door
going back into the bathroom here. These black
spots that you see here, here, and here, here and
here, over here and this one here all appeared to
be blood spatters. This is where what appeared
blood had run down this jamb.
Q. And now on Exhibit M would you indicate, please, where those spots appear¥
A. Yes. This would be the wall right above
the arm of the davenette in the living room. This
here spot, this spot here appeared to be blood
spots, and this spot here appeared to be a blood
spot which had been smeared. This is the facing
of the door casing that you might call a fourinch piece there. That black spot there which is
smeared down, these were very fine lines. They
looked like smears down there, appeared to be
blood." (R. 184-185).
He identified Exhibit 0 as the trousers that Penderville had on at that time. He attempted to point out some
spots indicating that some of them may have been made
by some kind of food. Two small spots appeared to be
blood. He stated that no chemical tests had been made
of the spots on the pants (R. 186). On cross-examination
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he said he had taken the pants from the defendant the
next day about noon in the City Jail. During the examination of the defendant's trousers (Exhibit 0) a red
capusle containing a red colored substance fell out of the
watch pocket of the exhibit (R. 194). It was probably a
seconal tablet which is usually packaged in that type of
capsule. No chemical analysis was made of its substance.
The witness testified he did not find any blood spots on
any of the other clothing of the defendant. He did not
find any blood spots on defendant's shoes. The witness
did not testify to any alleged blood spots on any of the
person or clothing of the defendant except two small
spots which may or may not have been blood spots on
his pants.
The State rested and out of the presence of the jury
defendant's counsel first made a motion to dismiss the
case, which was denied; he made a second motion to dis-miss the charge of first degree murder, which was
denied; he made a motion to reduce the charge to second
degree murder, which was denied; he made another
motion to reduce to voluntary manslaughter, which was
denied (R. 200-202).
The first witness for the defense was Dr. E. Le Verl
Barrett, a physician and surgeon. Dr. Barrett testified
that he had l\1rs. J nne Weiler Penderville under his
treatment from February, 1946 to February, 1949. He
treated the deceased primarily for the after effects of
excessive alcohol use. He testified that she was a chronic
alcoholic ( R. 204) .
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Dr. Jack Tedrow, a physician and surgeon specializing as a psychiatrist, testified that he treated Mrs.
Penderville for chronic alcoholism and barbiturate addiction from March 17 1949 to the last of April the same
'
year. In his opinion' the deceased
was a chronic alcoholic
and barbiturate addict. He testified that alcohol and
barbiturates have a cumulative effect to the extent that
a person becomes very sensitive to the use of alcohol and
requires more and more barbiturates. That both drugs
affect the nervous system (R. 206).
Dr. Willian1 D. O'Gorman, a physician and surgeon
specializing in neurology and psychiatry, stated that the
deceased was his patient from April 24-, 1949, until July
1, 1949. He treated her for psychosis in psychopathic
personality and addiction to alcohol and barbiturates (R.
208). In his opinion the deceased was a chronic alcoholic
and an addict to barbiturates. He testified that the
effect of chronic alcohol and barbiturate, taking the two
of them together, is a "vicious mixture, inasmuch as these
people over a long period of time finally undergo a
certain degree of degeneration of the brain. Prior to
that, however, they lose considerable control of their
own emotional reactions and, consequently, behavior
becomes more and more primitive." The witness testified
that a person addicted to alcohol and the use of barbiturates bleeds more easily than a person who is not. In
his opinion such a person would require a less severe
blow to cause death than a person who was not addicted
to the use of alcohol and barbiturates (R. 208-209).
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Sidney E. Gilchrist, the director of laboratories for
the Salt Lake City Health Department, testified that he
received samples of urine taken fr01n the body of the
deceased at the tin1e of the autopsy. That he examined
the urine samples for alcoholic content. The sample of
urine showed .:2-1 of 1 per cent of alcohol or .024 per cent.
In cross-exmuination he testified that the percentage of
alcohol in the urine translated into the concentration of
alcohol in the blood would be equivalent to .171 per cent.
He further testified that the point at which persons are
under the influence of intoxication starts at .015 per
cent; that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of
the deceased indicated she was under the influence of
alcoholic intoxication ( R. 212-213).
Burton G. Clay, testified that he was the chief auditor
of the Liquor Commission. At the outset of his testimony
Mr. Clay apparently recognized one of the jurors and
the court proceeded to chastize him in the following
language:
"THE COURT: It's highly improper for you
to make any gestures or advances to a juror. You
can't possibly have these other people to think
you are honest if you are going to play with a
juror. You embarrass that juror no end, for he's
been instructed not to talk to you, and would you
refrain from making any advances towards jurors.
A. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I will." (R. 216).
Mr. Clay identified Exhibits 3 to 9 inclusive as the
records of Store No. 3, being the time cards, machine
tapes and individual purchase cards of the defendant,
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Edgar Ronald Penderville, made on the 30th day of July,
1952 (R. 217-219).
Anna G. Robison testified that she was a cashier for
the Utah Liquor Commission and was so employed on
the 30th of July, 1952, at store No. 3 at 2nd South and
2nd East. She identified defense Exhibits 8 and 9 as
liquor cards that had been signed by the purchaser in
purchasing liquor at that store. She was not the regular
cashier. She was relieving a Mrs. French on the 30th of
July, 1952 (R. 221).
Cleo Porter testified that she was a cashier for the
Utah State Liquor Commission on the 30th of July, 1952,
at store No. 3. Exhibit No. 3 is her time card, which
includes the day of July 30, 1952. Exhibit No. 10 is the
tape from the machine she cashed with on that day.
Exhibit No. 9 was the purchase order. This purchase
order and the tape showed a serial number 87550. The
starting serial number for that day on purchases made
was 87322. The finishing number of sales made was
87907. That the number of sales made was 585. The
witness testified that she punched in on her time slip at
3 :41 P.M. That she punched out again at 6 :03 P.M. for
lunch. That she punched back in after lunch at 6:40P.M.
That she got off at 11:12 P.M. That the purchase card
of the defendant bearing serial number 87550 was the
226th sale that she made that day. The witness testified
that the sales on Wednesday July 30 1952 were con'
' could not
siderably under the average.' The witness
place the time when this sale was made under the pur-
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chase order 87550. It was definitely made after 4 :00
o'clock in the afternoon and before 11:12 that night. The
witness further testified there was no definite way she
could peg the time when the actual purchase was made.
The witness testified she did not know the defendant but
she remembered seeing him in the store (R. 223-230).
EVA W. SHAW testified that she was employed by
the Utah State Liquor Commission as a cashier on the
30th day of July, 1952, at store No. 3. She identified
Exhibit No. 9 as a sales card for the purchase of a fifth
of Davis County whiskey purchased on that date, July
30th, as shown by the purchase cards purported to be
signed by the defendant (R. 232-4).
FRED M. NEWSON, testified he was the manager
of the Davis Jewelry Company located at 161 South Main
Street in Salt Lake City. That on the 30th of July, 1952,
he sa.w the defendant and his wife, June Weiler Penderville, between 10 :30 A.M. and noon that day. He had a
conversation with them at that time. On cross' examination he placed the time as the 30th of July, 1952, as the
job repair envelope bore that date and that was the day
on which they picked it up (R. 235-6).
DELBERT F. DUNCOMBE, who testified for the
State, was called as a witness for the defendant. He
testified that at the time he searched the premises of the
Penderville aparbnent on the night of July 30th he found
a bottle of Davis County whiskey. It was in a fifth of a
quart bottle and it was about two-thirds or three-quarters
full (R. 237).
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WILLIAM J. CHRISTENSEN, a witness who testified for the State, was recalled as a defendant's witness.
His attention was called to a conversation he had with
Mr. Penderville at the Penderville apartment on the evening of July 30, 1952. Defendant's attorneys asked,
. ~"
"Would you state now the subject of that conversa t wn.
Objection was made upon the grounds of "hearsay, calling for self-serving statements, and calling for his conclusion as to what the subject matter was. The conversation itself would disclose it if it were competent." The
court ruled that the witness may answer as to the subject
matter without giving the conversation. "You may tell
what you talked about, what the subject was about." The
witness answered, "The first subject matter was about
my inquiry about \\·hat was the matter and about the lady
on the floor." The next question propounded to the witness was, "Did you have any conversation relating to the
subject matter of this case'" The State objected on the
grounds it was immaterial, and irrelevant, calling for
conclusion, hearsay, self-serving declarations. The witness answered, "I find that rather difficult, Your Honor.
My answer would be 'no,' that the case didn't exist then.
At that time there was no chance to talk about something
that did not exist." (R. 238-239).
RICHARD A. CALL, testified he was a physician
specializing in pathology and particularly legal medicine
or forensic medicine. That he was then assistant clinical
professor of pathology in the University of Utah College
of Medicine. The doctor testified that a dose of alcohol
plus another dose of barbiturates superimposed upon in-
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jury would cause death sooner and that in his experience
chronic alcoholics as well as addicts of any type may die
of relative minor injuries (R. 248-249), and that the consmnption of alcohol sufficient to produce a concentration
of .02-± per cent of alcohol in the urine, plus a sedation of
three grain and one-half seconal capsules would definitely
cause a loss of body function and control, and such a person would be more likely to fall (R. 250). The witness
further testified that trauma was not the only cause of
subdural hemmorrhages. Hemorrhagic diseases may result in what we call spontaneous subarachnoid or spontaneous subdural hemorrhage. Also there is a condition
which occurs congenitally. In other words, it's an alteration of certain vascular structures at birth. These may
rupture spontaneously and result in subdural hematoma.

"Q. Can tests be made to determine whether
or not there was such other causes other than blow
or impact that you mentioned~
A. There are many tests which could rule
them out." (R. 250-251).
The witness further testified:
"Q. And if there is a concentration of alcohol and barbiturates, a small blow would be more
likely to cause the condition we referred to, the
massive subdural hematoma, than if it were absent~

A. Well, now, I can say yes to that question.
That is correct. However, the readiness or the
increased hemorrhagic tendency does not depend
on the immediate level of alcohol or barbiturate.
It depends on a long-term chronic condition like
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chronic alcoholism or an addiction to some par.
ticular drug." (R. 251-252).
On cross-examination the witness testified that such
a hemorrhage would not produce death; there would have
to be some other superimposed condition (R. 254). The
doctor testified it was impossible to tell what the two
small spots were on Exhibit 0, the defendant's pants that
he wore the night of July 30th. That a chemical analysis
would have to be made to determine if the spots were
blood (R. 257). (Detective Duncombe testified they had
the appearance of blood). They could be blood, shoe
polish or many other substances. A laboratory analysis
would have to be made to determine what the spots were
(R. 257).
EDGAR RONALD PENDERVILLE, the defendant,
a retired officer of the U. S. Army Engineers. He
testified that on the 30th day of July, 1952, at about 6:45
in the evening, he left his apartment and drove his
Cadillac automobile down town to the liquor store at 2nd
South and 2nd East; that he made a purchase of a fifth
of Davis County whiskey. (This was the second purchase
of whiskey he n1ade that day, the first purchase being
made around 2 :00 in the afternoon when he was with
his wife. They had been shopping prior to that time).
From there he drove west on 2nd South and parked his
car between Main and State. He then went across the
street to the Pony Express Cafe where he ate his dinner.
He then returned to the car and drove home. When he
arrived horne he found his wife lying on the floor along
IS

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
the wall. He lifted her out from the wall as best he could
as he only has full use of one arm. Her nose was bleeding. He went to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash cloth
in cold water, bathed her face and went back and rinsed
the cloth out again and folded it over her forehead. He
then prepared an ice pack. Her right eye was swollen.
He got the bedspread from the bed and put over her.
About ten or fifteen minutes later he went downstairs
and called 1\Ir. Christensen. He could not state precisely
the time of the call but in his best judgment it was between a quarter of eight and a quarter after eight (R.
271-274). Their first trip to town was primarily to have
a watch band fixed and to leave two rings of June's to be
sized. They went to the Davis Jewelry Store and talked
to Mr. Newson, the manager of that store. Mr. Penderville identified Exhibits 8 and 9 as the purchase requisitions for liquor which he signed on that day (R. 287).
(Exhibits 3 to 11 inclusive were admitted in evidence. R.
288). The witness testified that when he returned from
town with his second liquor purchase, he found his wife
on the floor. He was not particularly alarmed. He denied that· he killed his wife (R. 288).
On cross-examination the witness testified as follows: That he left the apartment about 6 :45 that
night. He told the officers that in the best of his estimation he was gone about three-quarters of an hour. He
could not place the exact time that he returned. That it
could have been 7:30 or 7:45 P.M. He. did not believe
it could have been earlier than that (R. 289). When he
left the apartment his wife was in bed asleep. When he
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returned she was out of bed. She apparently had reInoved her dress and her shoes and stockings. She was
in a different physical condition when he returned, in
thi:-;, her right eye was considerably swollen, she was
bleeding from the nose. He did not make any observation
with rd'erence to abrasions and contusions on her scalp.
1 le did pitH'<' the ice pack upon her head. After he retunwd, the first phone call he made was to Mr. Christen~Pn, a lawyer. 1t was around between 8:00 and 8:15.
1 le was not angry when he returned home that evening.
\VlH·n he returned home his wife was breathing audibly
as ~he was lying on the floor on her back. He did not
clean up anything in the room after he returned except to
take the wa~h cloth and bathe his wife's face. He did not
remoYe any blood from the bed or any place else. Certain
spots were pointed out to him by the officer. He did not
know how they got there. He did not examine the spots
closely. On redirect examination the witness testified
that they had consumed the first fifth of whiskey. That
he had a drink or two out of the second fifth after the
inquisition started. He did not recall what he may have
told the officers as he was given a one ounce dose of
paraldehyde after the interrogation started at the police
station. He testified that his skull had been fractured
March 1, 1951 ( R. 289-296).
CAMILLA M. ANDERSON, called as a witness in
behalf of the defendant, testified as follows: That she is
a physician specializing in psychiatry. She graduated
from the University of Oregon Medical School. She began her training in psychiatry in January, 1931, in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
8tate of New York, and has been training in psychiatry
continuously in psychiatric hospitals, courses, lectures,
up to the present tin1e. That she is now teaching at the
University of Utah :Jiedical School. She testified that
paraldehyde is prin1arily a sedative. In larger doses it
has the capacity to produce a1nnesia or loss of memory
for what is happening without causing sleep. In other
words, a person can be up and about, or he can talk, or
he can carry out directions and have no memory, and the
loss of memory begins almost immediately following the
taking of the drug, within just a matter of a minute or
two. It is a drug that is used in obstetrics very frequently, so that women in labor will not remember any of the
occurrences of the labor and still will be able to cooperate
in the delivery of the baby (R. 299). In answer to the
question, "Does paraldehyde have anything to do with
whether a person tells the truth or whether he would tend
to falsify, is there any relation at all in that f' The witness answered :
"A. That has not been worked out very carefully, Your Honor, but the over-all effects are
comparable to sodium pentothal, which is used
somewhat in psychiatry in the practice in an effort
to determine truth and falsehood, and the patient
apparently lacks voluntary directional activity
while he is under this amnesic state." (R. 303-304).
The witness further testified that she had sufficient
opportunity to examine the defendant and. it was her
opinion that an ounce of paraldehyde would produce amnesia or loss of memory to what was happening without
being asleep. That paraldehyde affects the central ner-
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vous system in the same way as alcohol and barbiturates
(R. 301). A large dose of paraldehyde may cause a violent reaction to the person taking the same and cause
such a person to have abnormal behavior incident to other
forms of intoxication, such as repeated stumbling and
falling resulting in traumatic injuries (R. 303).
DELBER'l, F. DUNCOME, called in rebuttal on behalf of the State of Utah, testified that on the 31st day ·of
July, 1952, at about the hour of 11:00 A.M., he had a
conversation with the defendant in which the defendant
stated in substance and effect that he returned
to the apartment the night of the 30th about threequarters of an hour after he had left, and that would
make it about 7 :00 or 7 :15. He further testified that at
said time, in answer to the question, "Were you still
angry at that time, the time he returned, and he replied,
'I wasn't particularly angry, but I was angry when I got
in because I had left her in the bed.'" (R. 305). He admitted the defendant was given paraldehyde in the course
of this examination. On cross-examination the witness
stated that the defendant was simply giving his estimate
of the time when the events took place on the night of the
30th. He further stated that after defendant had taken
the paraldehyde he became very intoxicated. He staggered into the wall, bumped his head on the walls. When he
got in the jail he batted his head into the iron bars and
knocked himself flat (R. 307).
ELIZABETH ROSS, called out of order as a State's
witness, testified that she was a medical record librarian
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at the L.D.S. Hospital (R. 275). She produced and identified Exhibit P, the hospital records of June Penderville.
The records were under the name of Mrs. June Coggle.
The records are available for the doctors who are serving
the particular patients involved (R. 276).
DR. MAURICE J. TAYLOR, a state's witness called
out of order, testified as follows: That he is a medical
physician and certified as an internist by the American
Board of Medicine. That he knew the deceased, June
Penderville, under the name of June Weiler Coggle.
That he commenced treating her in August of 1949. That
he saw her frequently over a period of time up until June
3, 1952. That she was hospitalized in August ~r September, 1949, and then two or three admissions in 1951, and
the last admission in May of 1952. During these occasions blood tests were taken of the deceased. He made a
complete liver function test on the patient on three occasions, including all the various coagulation prothrombin
times, blood chemistry, blood figures, bleeding times,
and protein metabolism and liver function. The tests
were normal. "That alcoholism in and of itself, per se,
is not the cause of increased bleeding, but alcoholism
which has damaged the liver may give rise to increased
bleeding by the fact that the liver in its damaged condition does not produce a substance we call prothrombin,
and prothrombin is a vital element in the develop1nent
of coagulation and bleeding and the control of heinorrhage in individuals, and in alcoholics who have a severe
state of liver damage as a result of the alcohol effect,
when there is some doubt about whether the alcohol itself
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produces that or whether it's lack of food and other
factors; but in some individuals where they get what we
call <'irrhosis of the liver the liver does not produce pro' then is not available for the
thrombin, and prothrombin
rapid coagulation and clotting of the blood." (R. 280).
At the time of the three tests made upon the deceased,
the li \'Pr function test:-; were normal and there was no
damage at that time to the liver which might lead to a
bleeding tend<·n<·y as a direct result of alcohol (R. 280).
The witn<>~:-; testified that he saw the deceased at the
Newhouse Hotel on May 13th, about eight or nine days
later admitted her to the hospital, and subsequently saw
her in hi:-; office on June 3rd. When he first saw the patiPnt at the Newhouse Hotel, "she was in a very ragged
physical condition. She was thin and very disturbed emotionally. She had lacerations of her scalp, back of her
head, from which was oozing a purulent material. She
was bruised around both eyes. Her face was battered and
bruised. She had bruises on her body. She had evidences
of fractured ribs on both the right and the left side in
front, and she was bruised down over her private areas
and on her legs. On taking her to the hospital, we xrayed her chest, which showed evidences of fairly recent
healing fractures on both sides of the chest and the ribs.
She had a skull x-ray done in which there was unequivocal evidence of the possibility of a fissure fracture of
the skull. As a result of her bruising and so on, we did
liver function tests and blood studies to see if there was
any relationship between that and a bleeding tendency.
The studies did not prove any relationship, and there
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were no other evidences of spontaneous bleeding during
that period of time, and during all the period I knew her
from '-!9 to '3:2 there were never any evidences of spontaneous bleeding or bleeding of any unusual nature."
·)~·)_ ·)~'l)
(R. -"--_..~..._ () .

Both the State and defendant rested. The following
Inotions were made in chambers out of the presence of
the jury: ·•comes now the defendant and moves the court
to dismiss the entire charge for failure of the State to
prove the case." This motion was denied. "Comes now
the defendant and moves the court for a directed verdict
of not guilty." This motion was denied. "Comes now the
defendant and moves the court to dismiss the charge of
first degree murder for the reason that no premeditation
has been proved." After argument by Mr. Roberts, counsel for the State, the court said, "I will deny your motion
and let him argue it and see if they believe it." (R. 309).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
FORCING DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITH AN ATTORNEY
WHICH HE HAD DISMISSED, AND REFUSING DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO PROCURE OTHER COUNSEL, OR TO CONDUCT HIS OWN TRIAL, RENDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE AND CONVICTION VOID AS A
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 77-1-8 SUBPARAGRAPH 1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953; AND FURTHER DENIED
TO DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT:
(a) MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION AT THE
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND RENEWED AT THE
CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE. (R. 200, 309).

(b) MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF FIRST
DEGREE MURDER AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE
AND RENEWED AT THE CLOSE OF PEFENDANT'S CASE.
(R. 200, 309).
(c) MOTION TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
STATE'S CASE. (R. 202).

(d) THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE, AS RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL. (R. 50-66).
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD
WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENDERVILLE
APARTMENT.

ARGUl\fENT
POINT I. THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
FORCING DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITH AN ATTORNEY
WHICH HE HAD DISMISSED, AND REFUSING DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO PROCURE OTHER COUNSEL, OR TO CONDUCT HIS OWN TRIAL, RENDERED DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE AND CONVICTION VOID AS A
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 77-1-8 SUBPARAGRAPH 1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953; AND FURTHER DENIED
TO DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
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The facts with respect to this argument are adequately, and in detail, set forth in Defendant's Statement of Facts and will not be repeated here. In summary,
defendant on the 15th of December, 1952 wrote to the
judge of the trial court, which letter was delivered to
said judge before 10 :00 A.M. on the morning of the 16th
of December, 1952. That in said letter defendant asked
for a postponement of his trial for the reason that he had
felt it necessary to discharge his attorney. On the morning of the 16th the judge of the lower court summoned
defendant to his chambers and there in the presence
of defendant, the judge, and his certified court reporter
a rather lengthy discussion was had with reference to
the postponement and the securing of counsel for defendant. The following is pertinent:
"THE COURT: You are going to be tried
before the first of the month. I am going to try
this case.
MR. PENDERVILLE: Then I will have to
represent myself.
THE COURT: If that is what you want to
do, I am not going to permit that. I am going to
have you an attorney, and I am going to have Joe
McCarthy to represent you because I think he is
prepared on this case. He tells me he is, and there
isn't any reason in the world-! think you are doing this to stall this case, and I'm not going to let
you do it.
MR. PENDERVILLE: No, I'm not doing it
to stall anything."
It is defendant's contention that the lower court
erred in refusing to grant defendant a postponement of
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the trial in order to enable him to secure counsel to represent him. Further the court erred in failing to allow defendant to represent himself and in appointing counsel
for defendant whom the defendant had already discharged. That based upon these two errors the defendant wa~ not given a fair trial and was not accorded due
proces~ of law as required by the Fourteenth AmendInent of the Constitution of the United States. The crime,
as alleged in the information, was committed on July 30,
1952. The complaint and arrest of the defendant was had
August 1, 1952. The information charging defendant was
filed November 22, 1952. Defendant entered a plea of
not guilty December 6, 1952, and a trial was had on December 17, 1952. Less than one month expired between
the time the information charging the defendant with
first degree murder was filed and the time the trial was
held. The l!tah Constitution provides:
"Rights of accused persons - In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel,
* * *." (Art. 1, Section 12.)
Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"Rights of Defendants - In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled: (1) to appear
and defend in person and by counsel."
In 5 Am. J ur. par. 10- Attorneys at Law, it states:
"Every person, sui juris, who is charged with
crime has the constitutional right to try his own
cause, and a trial court is not justified in imposing
counsel on a defendant against his will unless in-

'

'
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deed, it appears that he is mentally incompetent
or not sui juris at the time of the trial. The constitutional provision relating to the right of a person to have the assistance of counsel was inserted
for the purpose of abrogating the common law
practice under which prisoners accused of felony
were denied such right, and to restrain the legislature from denying it by statute. Such provision
is merely permissive, and conditional upon the
pleasure of the accused. Prefering the protection
of the court or choosing to rely upon his own skill
and ability, he may not desire the assistance of
counsel. But he must elect by which method to
proceed; he cannot insist upon examining one
witness himself and then proceeding through his
counsel."
In the case of DIETZ V. STATE, 149 Wis. 462, 136
NW 166, 173, the court states :
"Every person sui juris, who is charged with
crime, has the right to try his own case, if he so
desires. The constitution guarantees him the right
to be heard "by himself" as well as by counsel.
(Constitution, Art. 1, par. 7.)
"The trial court would not have been justified in imposing counsel upon the defendant
against his will, unless indeed it appeared that he
was mentally incompetent or not sui juris at the
time of the trial."
Application of this principle of law is supported
in the case of BURGENDER V. STATE, 103 P. 2d 256,
55 Ariz. 411, wherein the court stated:
"Defendant insists that the action of the court
in first denying him the right to defend himself
and thereafter granting him such right violates
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Sec. 24, Art. 2, of the State Constitution which
provides : In criminal prosecutions, the a_ccused
shall have the right to appear and defend 1n person and by counsel, • • *"
''It does not seem to us defendant's contention
i~ right either in fact or law. The court's action
wa~ induced by defendant's own equivocation. It
appears he was able to employ an attorney and
did so when fin;t charged with the offense and
Judge Speakman's order requiring such attorney
to continue his services was for the protection of
defendant, who, prP~Ul!Jably, because of his youth
and inexperience and the nature of his defense
of insanity, was unable to defend himself intelligently. This order, although in the interests
of defendant, was probably erroneous. If, however, he was entitled to defend himself without the
assistance of counsel, the court offered to let him
do so. He asked for counsel, actually he was permitted 'to appear and defend in person, and by
counsel.' (Sec. 24, Art. 2, supra) He was given
and he accepted full measure of the constitutional
right.
"No complaint is made of the court's failure
to postpone the trial.
"* * * It is only persons who are sui juris
and mentally competent who are permitted to defend themselves without the aid of counsel. Note
to State of :l\1innesota v. Townley, 17 ALR 266."
The case of \YILKINSON V. YOUELL, 22 SE 2d
356, 180 Va. 321, 359, is also interesting in this regard:
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that no one
accused of crime is compelled to have counsel if
he does not so choose. On a writ of error in the
Barnes case (Barnes v. Com., 92 Va. 794 at page

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
803, 23 SE 78-!) it was held that the record must
show not only that the accused did not have counsel but that he was denied that right before the
judgment would be reversed. Judge Buchanan,
speaking for the court in that case, said: 'Every
person accused of crime has a right to have counsel to aid him in making his defense, but no one is
compelled to have counsel. * * * But we cannot
presume that the trial court denied the prisoner
the right to have counsel, or failed, if she were unable to employ counsel, to assign someone to aid
her in her defense.'
"In Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518,
6 SE 2d 670, 671, this court speaking through Mr.
Justice Eggleston, 'Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., page 700, as follows: The
right to counsel is permissive and conditional upon the pleasure of the accused. Preferring the
protection of the court, or choosing to rely upon
his own skill and ability, he may not desire the assistance of counsel.' See State v. Yoes, 67 W. Va.
546, 68 SE 181, 140 A. State Rep. 978."
Defendant was before the court personally. There
is no question raised as to his sanity and yet the lower
court absolutely refused to allow defendant to represent
himself and discharge his attorney. The court's own
statement is to the effect: "If that is what you want to do
I am not going to permit that. I am going to have you
an attorney and I'm going to. have Joe :McCarthy to represent you * * *" The very attorney which defendant
had discharged the day before is now appointed by the
court to forcibly defend the defendant in this action even
though the defendant has stated to the court that he does
not wish representation under these circumstances.
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With reference to allowing defendant a reasonable
time to secure other counsel and to grant a postponement
of the trial this court stated in the case of STATE V.
FAIRCLOUGH, 86 U. 326, 44 P. 2d 692, as follows:
"It is a general rule and justice requires, that
a person charged with a crime should have a reasonable time to prepare his defense, otherwise a
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial
might be nullified. 8 RCL 67. To insure defendant the full enjoyment of his constitutional privilege, the time between the appointment of counsel
by the court and the time of trial should be such
as to afford a reasonable opportunity for preparation of the defense. 16 CJ 823, 84 ALR 545. The
statute makes provision for the postponement of
trial upon sufficient cause shown. RS Utah 1933,
105-30-1. Whether a postponement of the trial
should or should not be granted on showing made
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court
and the matter of postponement will not be regarded as reversible error unless clearly prejudicial.
State v. Williams, 49 e. 320, 163 P. 1104; State
Y. Cano, G-! U. 87, 228 P. 563. What is a reasonable time for preparation for trial depends on
many things, such as whether the accused is confined in jail or is at liberty on bail, the nature and
gravity of the charge, the complexity of the facts
or circumstances involved in the crime, the number and availability of witnesses, the intracacy of
any law points that may be involved. Such matters
being \Vi thin the discretion of the trial court, its
decision is to be given great weight and ordinarily
will not be disturbed except for manifest abuse of
discretion or a showing of want of consideration
of the rights of the accused. Harris v. State 119
Ga. 114, 45 SE 973, 8 RCL 68."
'
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Apparently it was the lower court's opinion that defendant wa:s taking too long to prepare his defense for
the ra:se. As previously stated less than a month expired
between the time the information charging defendant
with first degree n1urder was filed and the time the trial
was held. This is a case of first degree murder in which
the life of the accused is at stake. Certainly it cannot
be held that such a period of time is unreasonable to
allow defendant to properly secure the representation
which he desires, and even in the event the court holds
that defendant had sufficient time to secure his defense,
the denial of the court to allow defendant to represent
himself rather than have forced upon him an attorney
whom he has discharged, certainly shows a want of consideration of the rights of the accused. Defendant was
confined in jail, he was not at liberty on bail. As far as
the record is concerned defendant had never been involved in a felony prosecution. This was an entirely
new experience for him. Can there be any greater prejudice shown than forcing a defendant to trial with an attorney in whom he has no confidence~ It is unquestionable that there was a difference of opinion as between
defendant and his former counsel as to how the trial
should be conducted and the investigations that sho~d
be made. Such is clearly set forth in the record that was
taken down by the certified court reporter at the time
defendant and the judge of the lower court discussed this
problem. But in the end who must decide what representation he is entitled to~ Certainly defendant being
competent in all respects should be the one to decide what
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he desires as far as representation is concerned and if he
cannot secure it from his counsel in the way he so desires,
then the constitution of the State of Utah and of the
United State~ gives him the right to defend himself.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT:
(a) MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION AT THE
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND RENEWED AT THE
CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE. (R. 200, 309).

(b) MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF FIRST
DEGREE MURDER AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE
AND RENEWED AT THE CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE.
(R. 200, 309).
(c) MOTION TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
STATE'S CASE. (R. 202).

(d) THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE, AS RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL. (R. 50-66).

'Ve direct the following argument to all of the foregoing motions. There is not a scintilla of evidence which
directly or indirectly justifies the conclusion that defendant was the perpetrator of the injuries sustained by the
deceased on the 30th day of July, 1952. We admit that
the deceased suffered traumatic injuries between the time
that Dr. Condie left the Penderville apartment about
6:00 o'clock P.M. and the return of the defendant to his
apartment later in the evening. We particularly call t:he
court's attention to the fact that it is not incumbent upon
the defendant to explain how and in what manner the de-
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ceased suffered these traumatic injuries. It is incumbent
upon the State to prove that the injuries were caused by
defendant. ~lere suspicion cannot be used to hurdle this
very ilnportant link in the chain of evidence if a conviction for murder in the second degree is to be sustained.
We have carefully analyzed the evidence in the above
Statement of Facts. We again call the court's attention
to the time element involved in this alleged crime. Dr.
Condie arrived at the Penderville apartment at 5:15P.M.
on the 30th day of July, 1952. He found Mrs. Penderville suffering from alcoholic and barbiturate addiction.
He had previously been treating her for chronic alcoholism. He definitely told the defendant that she would
have to be sent to the Salt Lake County Hospital for
treatment and, if necessary, committed to a mental institution (R. 119). The doctor advised Mr. Penderville if
he did not comply with his request, he did not wish to
have any more to do with the case. Mr. and Mrs. Penderville said they would let him know the following morning.
Mrs. Penderville was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and pleaded for something to help her sleep. The
doctor gave her three one and one-half grain seconal capsules and left another with Mr. Penderville to give his
wife if further sedation was required. Dr. Condie observed Mrs. Penderville had some old contusions about
the eyes, which he called black eyes. They were of old
origin. She had a few contusions about the face, particularly on the cheeks and jaw. He left at 6 :00 P.M. He
did not return that evening until approximately 9 :45
when he received a call from William Christensen, an at-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54
torney. These are undisputed facts in the case. The injuries which Mrs. Penderville received must have occurred after 6:00 o'clock.
The next important testimony is that of Susan Eliason, who testified that she resided in apartment No. 3
right over apartment No. 2 occupied by Mr. and Mrs.
Penderville. The bedroom and bathroom of the Eliason
apartment are directly over the bedroom and bathroom of
the Penderville apartment (R. 139). ::\fiss Eliason testified that she was getting dressed about the hour of 7 :00
P.Thl. on July 30th. She was in the bedroom and bathroom direetly over the corresponding rooms of the Penderville apartment. She heard a noise coming from below. It sounded like something was thumping on the wall
or the floor and it lasted until about 7:25 P.M. Her
testi1nony is fully quoted in the above statement of,facts.
She left the apartment about 7:25 and the noise was still
continuing when she left. She did not hear any cries, or
outcries, or screams of any kind, or persons voices at all
(R. 40). She did not pay any attention to the noise when
she went downstairs and knew nothing further about the
case until she returned later in the evening and learned
of the death of Mrs. Penderville. There is no reason to
disbelieve this young lady, who was 14 years of age and
rather young to be going on dates. She had no reason
to be making any misstatements. She said her mother
did not hear the noise because she was in another part of
the apartment looking at television. We accept the statements of Susan Eliason to be true. Something occurred
in the Penderville apartment between 7:00 and 7:25P.M.
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The defendant is a retired officer of the U. S. Army;
Engineers. He testified that on the 30th day of July, 1952,
at about 6:-1-5 in the evening, he left his apartment; drove
his Cadillac auton1obile downtown to a liquor store at
2nd South and 2nd East; he made a purchase of a fifth
of Davis County whiskey. (This was the second purchase
of whiskey he made that day, the first being made around
:2 :00 in the afternoon when he was with his wife. They
had been shopping prior to that time.) F'rom there he
drove west on 2nd South and parked his car between
:Jfain and State. He then went across the street to the
Pony Express Cafe where he ate his dinner. He then
returned to the car and drove home. When he arrived
home he found his wife lying on the floor along the wall.
He lifted her out from the wall as best he could as he had
only full use of one arm. Her nose was bleeding. He went
to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash cloth in cold water,
bathed her face and went back and rinsed the cloth out
again and folded it over her forehead. He then prepared
an ice pack. Her right eye was swollen. He got the bedspread and put over her. About ten or fifteen minutes
later he went downstairs and called Mr. Christensen.
He could not state precisely the time of the call, but his
best judgment was sometime between quarter of eight
and quarter after eight (R. 271-274). The witness' testimony was not disturbed an iota on cross-examination. He
told the officers to the best of his estimation he was gone
about three-quarters of an hour. He could not place the
exact time he returned. It could have been 7:30 or 7:45
P.M. He did not believe it could have been earlier than
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that (R. 289). When he left the apartment his wife was
in bed asleep. When he returned she was out of bed. Her
dress, shoes and stockings had been removed. She was
in a different physical condition when he returned than
when he left her at 6:45 P.M. Her right eye was considerably swollen, she was bleeding from the nose. He
did not make any observation with reference to abrasions
and contusions of the scalp. He did place the ice pack
upon her head. He was not angry when he returned home
that evening and was not particularly alarmed because
of his wife's condition. A more detailed account of his
testimony is given in the foregoing Statement of Facts.
The court's attention is called to the corroboration of the
defendant's testimony. Burton G. Clay, chief auditor of
the Utah State Liquor Commission, identified Exhibits
3 to 9 inclusive as records of Store No. 3, being the time
cards, machine tapes, and individual purchase cards of
the defendant, Edgar Ronald Penderville, made on the
30th day of July, 1952 (R. 217-219). Anna G. Robison,
Cleo Porter and Eva W. Shaw, three cashiers at Store
No. 3, further identified these records. Exhibit No. 9 was
the purchase order signed by the defendant. It bore
serial number 87550 and was the 226 purchase of the
585 sales n1ade at store No. 3 between the hours of 3:41
P.l\1. and 11:12 P.M. that night. Witness Cleo Porter
testified there was no definite way she could peg the
time when the actual purchase was made. The testimony
of these four witnesses clearly proved that two sales
of liquor were made to defendant on the 30th day of July,
1952; that the second sale was subsequent to 3:41 P.M.
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and being the :2:2G ~ale of 585 sales, a reasonable person
would conclude that the sale occurred sometime in the
evening of that day as testified to by the defendant.
Fred :\1. Newson, the manager of the Davis Jewelry
Company located at 161 South Main Street, testified that
he saw the defendant and his wife between 10:30 A.M.
and noon of that day. He had a conversation with them
at that time and on cross-examination referred to the job
repair envelope that bore that date, and that was the day
on which the Pendervilles were transacting business in
his store (R. 235-236).
Delbert F·. Duncombe, a state's witness who was later
called by the defendant, testified that he searched the
Penderville apartment on the night of the 30th of July
and he found a bottle of Davis County whiskey. It was
a fifth of a quart bottle and it was about two-thirds or
three-quarters full (R. 237).
William J. Christensen testified for the state that
he went to the Penderville apartment about 9 :00 o'clock
P.M. or a few minutes.,before on the 30th day of July in
answer to a telephone call from Mr. Penderville. That
Mrs. Penderville was lying on the living room floor with
a chenille bedspread over her body. The witness testified
that the defendant did not appear to be upset; that he
was perfectly rational ; that he did not seem to be alarmed or fearful; that he appeared to be about normal as he
had observed him on other occasions.
These witnesses certainly corroborate the defendant's story. There is no question that he was up town
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twice during the day of July 30th. He could not have
signed the two liquor card purchases if he had not been
uptown. The second purchase was certainly made hours
after the girl went to work at 3:41 P.M. as it was the 226
liquor purchase of the 585 sales made between the hours
of 3:41 P.M. and 11:12 P.M. that day. There was not
anything in the conduct and demeanor of Penderville
when State's witness William ChristenHen arrived which
would indicate guilt in any way whatsoever. The unfortunate part of Mr. Christensen's testimony was the
egregious error made by the court in refusing to permit
Mr. Christensen to testify to the conversation that he had
with the defendant when he arrived at the Penderville
apartment. This assignment of error will be treated later
in the brief.
nlr. G. J. Murphy, the caretaker of the apartments at
1012 Barbara Place, was called by the State and was permitted to testify that on or about a month before the alleged crime took place he heard the defendant arguing
with his wife, in which the defendant said, "Get up, get
up, get up off your dead ass and get me something to eat.
You haven't cooked me ten meals in the last six months."
This conversation was grossly immaterial and had no
proper place in the case at all. The witness further testified he knew the Pendervilles had a 1947 Cadillac. He
said it was constantly there and on the 30th of July he
saw it there all day (R. 170). This testimony was definitely impeached by other State's witnesses. The e-vidence
clearly establishes that defendant and the deceased were
uptown at least once in the early afternoon and the de-
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fendant alone was uptown in the early evening of July
30th. The witness first testified he did not see defendant
at anytime during the day of the 30th of July ( R. 171).
Later, in answer to the question how many times did you
see the defendant, the witness stated,
"Well I saw him the first time about 5:00
o'clock when I came in. That is generally when I
get through. Sometimes I have to go out after
dinner and pick up my hose or something, but at
5:00 o'clock he was at the phone when I went
through the office to go to our apartment; and
then, of course, naturally when we hear somebody
come in the door, we always go see who it is, see if
somebody wants something, and at five thirty he
was in there again, and so on, up to about six
thirty he was in and out using the phone. Of
course, we don't know who he was talking to. We
dt>n't want to know. It isn't our business.

Q. That's all right. Did you see him again
after six thirty~
A.

Yes, I did.

Q. What time was the next time you saw
him~

A. It was, oh, perhaps seven thirty.
Q. And where was he at that time~ Where
did you see him at that time~
A. He came down to use the phone again.
Q. And when did you next see him~
A. I don't think I saw him after that until
the officers took him out.
Q. And that was the last time that you saw
him then before the officersA. Yes." (R. 172).
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His testimony was impeached by his own statements
made at the preliminary examination rnany months before (P.T. 93) when he testified as follows:
··Q. Question, 'Now, calling your attention
to July 30, did he have occasion to use your phone
numerous times that evening~' Answer, 'Yes.'
Question, 'Will you relate to the best of your
recollection as to how many times and when he
used your phone?' Answer, 'Well, he used it about
five o'clock, five thirty, five forty-five and six
thirty, and then ~gain about nine thirty, nine or
nine thirty.'
A. Yes, he did.
Q. There is no mention of the time there of
seven thirty, at all~
A. Well, it was possible I didn't think of it
at the time." (R. 174).
The foregoing testimony is what the State relies
upon to prove that the defendant killed his wife. There
are no admissions or confessions of any kind whatsoever.
The fact that she met with some traumatic injuries during a period from approximately seven o'clock until seven
twenty-five certainly does not justify a finding that the
defendant committed the alleged violence on his wife.
There is not any question that ~Irs. Penderville's nose
was bleeding when Mr. Penderville returned. There is
not any question that there was a difference in her physical condition as far as injuries were concerned from the
time that Dr. Condie left her at six o'clock and when Le
returned at nine forty five. There is not any question
that there was a difference in her physical condition from
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the time defendant left at about six forty five P.M. and
when he returned about seven thirty or seven forty-five
P.:\I. Defendant freely admitted that her condition was
changed. He testified when he left the apartment his wife
was in bed asleep. 'Yhen he returned she was out of bed.
Her dress, shoes and stockings had been removed. She
was in a different physical condition when he returned in
this, her right eye was considerably swollen, she was
bleeding frmn the nose. When he returned home his wife
was breathing audibly and she was lying on the floor on
her back. When certain spots were pointed out to him
by the officer, he did not deny what they were. He stated
he did not examine the spots closely. His wife had a severe nose bleed and he did the normal and logical thing
in rinsing out a wash cloth in cold water, bathed her face
and went back and rinsed the cloth out again and folded
it over her forehead and then put an ice pack on her head.
At six o'clock Dr. Condie testified the deceased was
in a state of intoxication from excessive use of alcohol;
that he refused to treat her further unless they would
agree that she be sent to the Cpunty Hospital and possibly to a mental institution (R. 119). She also at that
time had been using paraldehyde as he detected it on her
breath ( R. 126). This vicious mixture of paraldehyde,
seconal and alcohol would cause a violent reaction to the
person taking the same and cause such a person to have
abnormal behavior, such as repeated stumbling and falling resulting in traumatic injuries (R. 301-303). It is a
common observation to see drunk people stumble and
fall causing severe traumatic injuries without apparent
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pain or outcry. The central nervous system being anesthetized by depressants such as paraldehyde, seconal or
alcohol or the combination of the same, readily explains
'
the absence
of cries, screams and outcries which certainly
would have been present if a normal person was undergoing ~mch punishment. It may be argued that during
this thumping proce~~ Mrs. Penderville was choked off by
some type of garrote and, therefore, was unable to make
any outcry or scream. This theory is highly improbable
if not impossible as a person could not be conscious for a
half hour of such treatment. If she had been choked into
insensibility the result would have been unconsciousness
or death long before a half hour of such abuse. Furthermore, if there had been some sort of a noose about her
neck, there is none the writer can think of which would
produce two straight lines as Mrs. Penderville had in the
pictures which are in evidence. (Exhibits B and C). If
someone had choked her with some rope or tie and had
bumped her head up and down on the floor the trauma
would have been on the forehead and not on the vertex
and back of the head. To have the bruises on her scalp
where they were, the garrote would have had to extend
all around her neck, and there was no evidence of any
neck n1arks except on the front and one side of the neck.
The marks on her neck might well have been produced by
rubbing her neck from side to side over a moderately
sharp piece of wood, such as the rung of a chair, and in
fact, her head was resting on the rung of the chair when
Penderville found her.
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Dr. Richard Call, clinical professor of pathology at
the University of Utah, testified that the consumption of
alcohol sufficient to produce a concentration of .024 of
alcohol in the urine, plus a sedation of three grain and
one-half seconal capsules would definitely cause a loss of
body function and control and such a person would be
more likely to fall (R. 250).
Again we repeat, it is not incumbent upon the defendant to explain how she sustained these injuries.
Where is there any evidence that the defendant committed any Yiolence upon his wife1 There has been an array
of medical testimony introduced in this case largely concerning the tendency of an alcoholic or barbiturate addict
to bleed more easily than a normal person. Practically
all of the medical testimony given in the case answers
that issue in the affirmative. The high medical reputation of the men so testifying for the defense lends a lot
of credence to their testimony. The State in rebuttal
called Dr. :Maurice J. Taylor, who testified that sometime
during the period from August, 1949, until June 3, 1952,
on two or three occasions, blood tests were taken of the
deceased. That he made a complete liver function test
on the patient on three occasions, including all the various coagulation prothrombin times, the blood chemistry,
blood figures, bleeding times, protein metabolism and
liver function. He stated the tests were normal (R. 280).
His testimony is set out in detail in the above Statement
of Facts.
It is the consensus of opinion of the other doctors
who testified in the case that the effect of alcohol in some
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people is to alter not the bleeding time but the permeability of the vessels in such a way as to permit extravasation of blood into the tissues upon the most minor trauma.
This tendency to bleed is thus not possible of determination by use of the common bleeding time test, or the clotting time test; that ecchymosis results in any minor appreciable trauma. Irrespective of the apparent medical
disagreement between the array of doctors called by the
defense and Dr. Taylor, it is not incumbent upon the defendant to explain medically, or otherwise, how the
changed physical condition of the deceased occurred.
Defendant's counsel are of the opinion that the injuries
suffered by :Mrs. Penderville were the result of the abnormal reaction of the deceased to the large dosage of
paraldehyde, seconal and alcohol taken by the deceased
or given to her by the attending physician. Loss of body
function and control in extreme alcoholism is a common
experience with alcohol addiction. Alcohol addicts fall
and commit serious traumatic injuries upon themselves.
In going over the evidence, may we submit that the location of the scalp bruise could best be accounted for by a
fall-striking first on her knees (the court will note that
the knee bruises were more recent than most of the
others), then pitching forward striking her head on the
edge of the arm chair and landing with her neck across
the rung face down. The chair was against the wall and
most of the blood spots were found on it. The deceased's
head was resting on the rung when she was found but her
face was up and she was lying supine rather than prone.
That the banging heard by the girl upstairs was caused
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by the deceased's efforts to free herself from the chair.
She tried and tried to get free, banging the chair against
the wall at each atten1pt and finally managed to get herself turned around face up, but in the process did two
things: (1) She scratched her neck and one side of her
face on the rung and leg of the chair ; and ~ 2) She used as
strenuous effort as she was capable of using in her state
and in so doing she elevated her blood pressure and thus
encouraged increased hemorrhage from the injury which
she had sustained to her brain and its coverings when she
struck it in falling. The defendant's muscular disability
in his left arm (R. 272) would have made it physically
impossible for him to have lifted her weight with one
arm and to have banged her head against the wall for the
period of time the banging was alleged to have continued.
No finger nail marks could possibly have made the even
lines to be seen on her neck, and with her tendency to
bleed, had the whole hand been used in knocking her head
against the wall, hand marks would have shown up because of her tendency to bruise easily. There were numerous blood marks on the walls and doors but, according to the testimony and the exhibits, none were found
above the elevation of the chair which would justify the
finding that the trauma was caused by defendant's banging the deceased's head against the wall. Another interesting observation is the fact that no blood was found
on the defendant's clothing or his person. Detective Duncombe testified there were two small spots which had the
appearance of blood on the defendant's pants, Exhibit 0.
There is no competent evidence that would justify the
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finding that these two small spots were blood. There
were other spots which the detective admitted were food
spots. The fact that his shoes and the rest of his clothing
contained no blood spots of any kind, is the strongest evidence that the defendant did not and could not have
banged his wife's head against the floor or the walls for
a period of at least a half hour as indicated by the testirnony of Husan Eliason. The numerous blood spots
pointed out by Detective Delbert F. Duncombe on the
chair, the wall, the books and the box that contained the
books, the floor, the bed, as shown in Exhibits J, K, L
and l\1, as more particularly set forth in the analysis of
his testimony in the above Statement of Facts, are the
strongest evidence that the injuries which caused the
blood to spatter as indicated by these findings, could not
have been caused by the defendant, whose clothes and
person were free from such blood spots. How can this
evidence justify a finding that the defendant could bang
his wife's head against the floor and walls of this room
for a period of more than twenty five minutes, causing
the injuries which she suffered, without his clothes coming in contact with the blood that spurted out on the
walls, the floor, the chair, and other furniture in the
room~ Defendant's counsel condemn most severally the
inadequate and slothful investigation made by the detectives in this case. The F.B.I. were never called in to
make a thorough investigation of the physical evidence
in the room in which the deceased died. The F.B.I. laboratories were never used in the examination of alleged
blood spots. The furniture, including the chair, was not
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preserved. The failure to n1ake a proper analysis of
alleged blood spots, the total failure to type the blood
spots with that of the deceased, the failure to make an
observation as to the presence of incriminating evidence
under the finger nails of the defendant, the grossly inadequate autopsy by an ordinary physician not qualified in the field of pathological research and the failure
to make a vaginal examination to determine if there had
been a criminal assault, are a sad commentary on the
ability of the detection officials in this case. It appears
to defendant's counsel that the detectives drew a conclusion that defendant killed his wife and then proceeded to
rule out any and all other theories, even though they ignored the duty of a competent investigator to protect
the innocent as well as convict the guilty. From the factual point of view, we ask in all sincerity, where is the
evidence that will justify a finding that the defendant
killed his wife~
We again repeat it is not the duty of the defendant
to explain the injuries suffered by the deceased when
there is no evidence to show any causal connection with
such injuries and the actions of the defendant. By way of
conjecture, sometime prior to this unfortunate death of
Mrs. Penderville, the defendant suffered a fractured
skull as a result of a beating administered by the deceased's former husband. Is it unreasonable to conjecture that such a person may have encountered Mrs.
Penderville in her apartment and committed the alleged
injuries~ It is rather peculiar that when l\Ir. Penderville
left his wife was in bed fully clothed except for her shoes;
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that when he returned she was practically nude on the
floor. No person in their right mind would have us believe that a husband would tear the clothes from his
wife. What motive or reason did Mr. Penderville have
to slaughter his wife in the manner which the State would
have us believe~ There was no evidence. offered by the
State to show a nwdical or other record of the defendant
which may even suggest any form of violence or sexual
perversion or abberation such as Psychomotor Epilepsy.
The highly incompetent testimony of Dr. Maurice Taylor
introduced over the objections of defendant's counsel concerning the condition in which he found the deceased at
the Newhouse Hotel on the 13th of ~lay, 1952, is pertinent
in this, that not an iota of evidence can be found in the
record to show any causal connection of the defendant
with this episode. One thing is certain, if the defendant
was implicated in any way, the State would have introduced the evidence to show criminal intent on the subsequent occasion now before the court. The only evidence
in the entire record which has the slightest bearing upon
the question of intent is the statement of the caretaker,
G. J ..l\Inrphy, who testified that on or about the 1st of
July, 1952, approximately thirty days before the death of
l\Irs. Penderville, he heard the defendant arguing with
his wife in the bedroom. Defendant said, "Get up, get up,
get up off your dead ass and get me something to eat.
You haven't cooked me ten meals in the last six months."
The deceased's experience at the Newhouse Hotel on May
13th, resulting in terrific traumatic injuries as testified
to by Dr. Taylor, would have been invaluable evidence
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in deterrnining the question of criminal intent on the part
of the defendant, provided the State had offered evidence
proving the defendant committed the assault upon his
wife at the Newhouse Hotel resulting in the injuries
aforesaid. \Vithout this causal connection the testimony
is highly incornpetent, immaterial, and the objection of
defendant's counsel should have been sustained until the
State produced the evidence that the defendant committed the assault in question. That no such evidence was
produced is indicative of the fact that the defendant did
not commit the assault. Dr. Taylor testified as follows:
·•A. Well, I first saw the patient in the Newhouse Hotel. She was in a very ragged physical
condition. She was thin and very disturbed emotionally. She had lacerations of her seal p, back of
her head, from which was oozing a purulent material. She was bruised around both eyes. Her
face was battered and bruised. She had bruises
on her body. She had evidences of fractured ribs
on both the right and the left side in front, and
she was bruised down over her private areas and
on her legs. On taking her to the hospital, we xrayed her chest, which showed evidences of fairly
recent healing fractures on both sides of the chest
and the ribs. She had a skull x-ray done in which
there was unequivocal evidence of the possibility
of a fissure fracture of the skull. As a result of
her bruising and so on, we did liver function tests
and blood studies to see if there was any relationship between that and a bleeding tendency. The
studies did not prove any relationship, and there
were no other evidences of spontaneous bleeding
during that period of time, and during all the
period I knew her from '49 to '52 there were never
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any evidences of spontaneous bleeding or bleeding
of any unusual nature." (R. 282-283).
The admission of this evidence under the ruling of
the court that it was competent in determining "whether
or not she (the deceased) would have a tendency to bleed
rnore so than ordinarily" on a subsequent occasion more
than 2lf2 1nonths later is beyond credence. The admission
of this evidence with the court's approval would naturally
inflame and prejudice laymen jurors who, under the circumstances, would not be capable of properly analyzing
such evidence. The fine distinction advanced by the
court for its admission would be lost in the inflamed and
prejudiced minds of laymen.
Furthermore, the burden is upon the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements in the
crime of murder in the second degree:
"1. That on or about the 30th day of July, 1952, at
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Edgar
Ronald Penderville killed June Weiler Penderville.
2.

That the killing was with malice aforethought.

3. That defendant intended to kill June Weiler
Penderville but that he did not deliberate or premeditate
upon the killing, or that the defendant did not intend to
kill June Weiler Penderville but that he did intend to
do great bodily harm to June Weiler Penderville.
4.

That said killing was unlawful.

5.

That the killing was felonious.
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6. That the said June \Y eiler Penderville died within a year and a day after the cause of death was administered." ( ~ee Ins. No. 1:2, R. ~S).
\Vhere is there any evidence to support the element
of •·malice aforethought" as defined by Instruction No.
13 (R. 29). There is not a scintilla of evidence in the
entire case with the widest possible implication that
would justify a finding that the defendant killed his wife
with malice aforethought. The criminal code of the State
of r tah provides, "that in every crime or public offense
there must be a union or joint operation of act and intent
or criminal negligence." (76-1-20 Criminal Code, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953). Criminal negligence only comes
into the crime of involuntary manslaughter. All other
degrees of homicide require the element of criminal
intent. First- and second degree murder require that the
intent must be coupled with malice aforethought. The
record is silent as to any evidence direct or otherwise
that the defendant ever had a criminal intent to kill ills
wife with malice aforethought. The elements of the crime
of which he was convicted are not sustained by the evidence and defendant contends that there is a total lack
of evidence to justify a finding that defendant had anything to do with the death of his wife, June Weiler
Penderville.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD
WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENDERVILLE
APARTMENT.
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William J. Christensen was called as a witness by
the State and interrogated with reference to the conditions and circurnstances that he found at the Penderville apartment when he arrived there and at the time
Mrs. Penderville was on the floor of the apartment dying.
The testimony of Mr. Christensen is fully set forth in
the Statement of Facts, pages 20-24 and 34, and will
not be repeated in detail here. The State, upon cross
examination by counsel for defendant, objected to Mr.
Christensen testifying as to any conversations he had
with defendant during this period of time. It should be
remembered that Mrs. Penderville was dying and was
on the floor of the apartment. The State objected to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay and improper cross-examination and the court sustained the
objection, and refused to allow the witness to testify in
any respect as to the conversations. Upon the witness
William J. Christensen being called by the defense, the
defense again attempted to secure the context of the
conversations that were had during this period of time
between :Mr. Christensen and defendant. The State
again objected, this time upon the ground it was hearsay,
and calling for self-serving statements. Again this court
sustained the objection of the State and refused to allow
the witness to testify with regard to these conversations.
It is defendant's contention that the lower court erred in
refusing to allow this witness to testify with reference
to the conversations at that time. The State fully interrogated the witness with respect to the conditions he
found a.t the time he arrived at the Penderville apart-
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ment. It is defendant's contention that these statements
and conversations during this period of time were part of
the res gestae and c01npetent and ad1nissible to be presented to the jury. The American Law Institute, Model
Code of Evidence, par. 512, Contemporaneous or Spontaneous Statements, states:
"Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissible if the judge finds that the hearsay statement
was made (a) while the declarant was perceiving
the event or condition which the statement narrates or describes or explains, or immediately
thereafter; or (b) while the declarant was under
the stress of a nervous excitement caused by his
perception of the event or condition which the
statement narrates or describes or explains."
"Comment: It is generally held that it is
unnecessary that the declarant be qualified as a
witness in this exception to the hearsay rule.
Clauses (a) and (b) require that the declarant
shall have perceived the event or condition, so
that the requisites of Ru1e 104 are necessarily
complied with. Clause (a) is in accord with the
theory and result of a large number of cases. It
expresses what Professor James Bradley Thayer
believed to be the ru1e applied in the so called res
gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule. * * * Clause
(b) also is in accord with the theory and result of
a large number of cases. It expresses what Dean
Wigmore believes to be the rule applicable in the
res gestae exceptions, and is accepted in a large
majority of the modern opinions * * *."
In DILLARD V. STATE, 165 So. 783, 786, 27 Ala.
App. 50, the court states:
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"On the question as to what constitutes the
res gestae there can be no set rule. From the
facts of ea'ch case the question of res gestae must
be determined. The expression 'res gestae' as
applied to crime, mean~ t~e complete. crimi~al
transaction from its beginning or starting pomt
in the act of the accused until the end is reached.
As stated, what in any case constitutes the res
gestae of the crime depends wholly on the character of the crime and the circumstances of the case.
Generally, the rule appears to be, in homicide
cases, that all the surroundings and circumstances
attending the killing, the declarations of the
accused at and after the killing, and his conduct
at and after the killing, while at or near the scene,
are admissible and form part of the res gestae."
June Penderville wa~ dying at the time William J.
Christensen arrived at the apartment, and she passed
away some forty-five minutes after he arrived. Certainly,
based upon the rule of res gestae, the utterances, declarations and conduct of the accused during this forty-five
minute period are relevant and should be allowed to be
placed before the jury.
In the case of JACKSON Y. UTAH RAPID
TRANSIT CO., 77 U 21, 290 P. 970, 976, the court stated:
"The general limitations of the res gestae
rule are 'That the declaration or utterance must
be spontaneous or instinctive; that it must relate
to or be connected with the main or principal
event or transaction itself material and admissible
in evidence and that it must have been the result
or product, the outgrowth, of the immediate and
present influences of the main event, or preceding
circumstances to which it relates, and must be
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contemporaneous with it and tend to explain or
elucidate it. * ** * That the word 'contemporaneous' is not taken literally, and that time is not
the real governing factor in the determination, but
is an important element in determining whether
the statements are spontaneous and immediately
connected with the main transaction and prompted
or produced by its immediate and present influence."
The State in interrogating the witness Christensen
opened up the case with respect to physical conditions
found by witness Christensen, i.e., the position of the
body, condition of the body, the fact that defendant was
there present, the conduct of the photographers and
detectives in arranging the body, etc., thereby raising
inferences and suspicion in the minds of the jurors that
the victim, June Penderville, had been murdered and that
defendant was the murderer. Certainly defendant is
entitled to bring out the entire transaction and circumstances, the utterances that were made, in order to present to the jury a complete picture of what occurred during this forty-five minute period of time in which June
Penderville was dying. Certainly he should be given the
right to rebut these inferences which the State has built
up by going into the conditions and circumstances that
existed. Refusal to allow defendant to rebut that testimony by bringing out the utterances and conversations
that were had was prejudicial and erroneous.
It has been stated as a general rule that where the
State's case rests largely upon circumstantial evidence
greater latitude is allowed in admission of circumstances
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which tend to throw light on any issues in the case. See
ETHRIDGE V. STATE, 110 SW 2d 576, 133 Texas Crim.
Rep. 287. Certainly such would be the case in the.present
prosecution as the State?s entire case is rested upon circumstantial evidence.
In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, par. 315,
page 425, Explanation of Motive, Intent, etc. it is stated:
"It is clear that facts and circumstances in
every transaction exhibit two phases: First,
relevancy to establish an ultimate fact; second, an
explanation of the facts and circumstances themselves that is relevant against the ultimate facts.
In this view the entire transaction should go before the court, the accused's whole conduct-his
utterances, his acts, and demeanor-should be
received-and his explanation of his acts, conduct, and demeanor should go in to rebut or negative the case against him. Any exclusion of this
renders the decisions of the various courts indefensively inconsistent and places an arbitrary
limit upon the accused which is unjust in view of
the freedom allowed the prosecution in adducing
facts and circumstances against him."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion defendant submits that the judgment
and conviction of the trial court should be declared null
and void for the reasons stated herein.
Respectfully submitted,

417 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

McCULLOUGH, BOYCE &
McCULLOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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